Sticking to its traditional policy of non-interference, China has adopted a cautious stance on the tug of war over Ukraine. Faced with pressing separatist threats and energy needs, Central Asia would be another matter.
China's President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan arrive in France on Tuesday for a four-day visit, to include a state dinner in Paris and a concert at the Palace of Versailles, as the two countries celebrate 50 years of full diplomatic ties.
On November 29, 2013, an international cargo train Chang’an (“Lasting Peace”) departed from Xi’an, the capital city of Shaanxi province in central China, and traveled westward toward Central Asia.
A regional security alternative should replace a weakened U.S. Pacific presence
For China, the Central Asian countries are of strategic importance due to the presence of hydrocarbon resources. Recently, the Beijing intensifies significantly expand energy cooperation with countries of the region.
On November 12, the Third Plenary of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a major turn to market-oriented policies: interest-rate and currency liberalization, reform of banks and state enterprises, clearer land ownership for rural inhabitants, and a better deal for urban migrants.
Indian Premier Manmohan Singh’s October 21–22 visit to Moscow not only reaffirmed traditional Indo-Russian amity, it also revealed significant trends in Asian developments that affect both parties as well as other key players like the United States, China and Pakistan.
In the context of Ukraine’s political and economic options, Beijing can be the ideal supplemental partner for Kyiv.
In the run up to the 13th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit last month, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited four Central Asian countries to discuss bilateral cooperation initiatives. The political and financial value of the agreements he reached reflect China’s growing influence in the region, primarily at Russia’s expense.
This is a three-part series on China's evolving strategic interests in Central Asia and in its own far northwest, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Part 1 looks at Xinjiang's history as a "buffer region" protecting China's core and linking it to Eurasia. This installment also examines recent efforts by Beijing to adapt the region's legacies to new uses