India has a big "tooth" for China in the Indo-Pacific

India has a big "tooth" for China in the Indo-Pacific

By Arthur Dunn


China clearly understands the potential danger of India’s military presence at the entrances to the strategic Malacca Strait and states that, in the desire, on the one hand, to maintain their independent status in the traditions of the non-alignment movement, and on the other hand, to realize their geopolitical ambitions military rapprochement with the United States and its allies in India is increasingly difficult to maintain the delicate balance of its foreign policy.

Formed by the United States, Japan, Australia and India, the framework of the military-political alliance in the Indo-Pacific region has a reliable support in Taiwan, whose authorities are led by the elected in 2016 President Tsai Wing, the “green camp” of the Democratic Taiwan’s independence from mainland China is wholly focused on the United States to such an extent that Chinese experts  call the Taiwan authorities a “US strategic pawn”.

China sees how the United States continues and even increases its arms sales to Taiwan and high-tech combat control equipment; encourage the state program of the President of Taiwan for the production of its own weapons, first of all, combat boats and even its own crewless submarine, in the construction of which Japanese specialists are involved; send a US Navy research vessel to the Kaohsiung port in Taiwan; over and over again demonstrating to the authorities in Beijing the passage of American warships with guided missile weapons through the Taiwan Strait and near the disputed Xisha (Paracel Islands) in the South China Sea, which China nevertheless considers its territory; adopt, in early 2018 in Congress, the Law on Travel to Taiwan, which regulates American civil servants to travel to Taiwan; in September 2018, in the Senate, the Taipei draft law provides for the recall of American ambassadors from those states that broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

All these actions of the United States, in the opinion of the Chinese side, in one degree or another violate the “one China” principle, on which all three Chinese-American communiqués (August 28, 72; December 16, 188, August 17, 1982) about the principles of relations between the United States and PRC. According to Chinese experts, the behavior of the United States, constantly “interceding” for the “red line”, which in China is uniquely considered to be Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait zone, as well as the disputed islands Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha (Spratly) in the South China Sea, element of pressure as part of the overall strategy of military-political deterrence of China in the Indo-Pacific region.
For continental China, Taiwan and for Russia, Ukraine are “innermost” territories, a potential military conflict with which would not be the usual armed clash of the opposing sides, but, in fact, the hardest, most tragic war between people of the same blood.
Under the conditions of both direct and indirect military and political pressure from the United States, their allies and partners, Russia and China objectively unite the need to effectively resist such pressure. However, the current form of the “Russian-Chinese strategic partnership”, developed on a difficult historical path, is clearly insufficient to achieve this goal.

According to experts, the main forces of the US Navy and Air Force are concentrated in the APR on the Chinese direction. But, on the other hand, continental China is still separated by wide sea spaces from the Japanese islands with the main bases of the 7th fleet of the US Navy and from the American outpost in the APR - Guam. China does not directly border with South Korea, and for many decades, the troubled border with India passes through deserted highland areas on the distant outskirts of China.
The western borders of Russia are increasingly turning into a place of confrontation, from where to some of its large cities there are not even minutes of missile flight time, but only a few tank crossings. Perhaps in a critical situation, Russia will indeed receive real military support from China. I gave, as claimed by a number of sources, the Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of China to order the PLA Navy ships in the Mediterranean to go under Russian command during the April 2018 crisis around Syria in the event of the start of hostilities with the Armed Forces of the NATO countries.
However, in the conditions of “cold” confrontation with the United States, its allies and partners, China, traditionally understanding the relations of the alliance, including military, as the inevitable “suppression” of the sovereignty of the “junior” ally, the “senior” ally (although it is not clear who is the eldest, who is the youngest), does not come out in relations with Russia beyond the "strategic partnership". In the Chinese sense, this means strict implementation of previously reached agreements, and no more.



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