By Actualized the problem of the dynamics of relationships in the " geopolitical triangle " Ankara -Tbilisi-Baku.
To date, Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan have already format permanent tripartite meetings at the level of presidents , prime ministers , foreign ministers and so on, which is one of the most important levers to coordinate their foreign and economic policy in the region. This trend has been institutionalized around the beginning of 2007 , when, during the official visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Georgia held a trilateral meeting between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia , as well as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
During all these meetings , formal declarations and statements of the parties contained profitable for Azerbaijan language regarding the Karabakh conflict , mentioning his "territorial integrity".
At the end of 2012 the new Georgian authorities announced the possibility of restoring and reopening of the Abkhaz railway ( as a measure to improve the relations between Moscow and Tbilisi) , Azerbaijan very nervously reacted to it. It is clear that the resumption of railway communication through Abkhazia reduce the extent of communication blockade of Armenia. And then it will increase its potential in the Karabakh conflict.
Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan seek to coordinate their positions in the polls and public manifestations of their approaches on the grounds various international forums and organizations (UN General Assembly , PACE, OSCE), as in the settlement of regional ethnic conflicts , and on domestic issues. Along with this, Turkey and Azerbaijan are trying constantly to refrain from more harsh language against Russia , as it has always insisted on the Georgian side. For example, during the vote on the Abkhaz problem within the framework of the UN General assambeli.
However, none of the tripartite (Azerbaijan -Georgia-Turkey) or multilaterally (eg , in the framework of cooperation with NATO) Army of the three countries are under no obligation sharing and cooperation at the operational level. And no mutual security guarantees and mutual defense between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on the political level. Except for certain provisions of the Treaty of Kars in 1921 , according to which Ankara, along with Moscow , is the guarantor of the status of Adjara Autonomous Republic. As yet there is no reason to argue about the Azerbaijani -Turkish- Georgian relations in categories drawn up strategic military and political alliance with clear objectives and obligations of the parties higher level than it is now enshrined a "strategic partnership."
The Georgian side is trying to use its monopoly largely transit- communication status for Azerbaijan , trying to get the maximum dividends for the use of its territory to pump Caspian energy resources. For example , Georgia, except for the actual transit fees for the transit of energy resources also receives a share of the Azerbaijan oil transit through its territory. In addition , Georgia at preferential rates has the ability to purchase gas at the expense of the transit of Azerbaijani gas through the "Baku -Tbilisi- Erzurum gas pipeline." And some of the gas as a transit fee.
Promising projects in the energy sector , the construction of a new gas pipeline to supply Azerbaijani gas in the development of the second stage of gas field Shah Deniz through Georgia and Turkey to the EU.
Another project is the construction of the Kars -Akhalkalaki -financed by the Azerbaijani side. It will connect the transport systems of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey , bypassing Armenia.
In the summer of 2013 the then Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili said that the completion of construction delayed for two years , as a result of the country " may lose the function of the regional center."
It is remarkable to note that Turkey is trying to develop their religious and social activity of Azerbaijanis in Georgia. Azerbaijan, together with Turkey , from time to time trying to draw attention to the problems of the official Tbilisi Meskhetian Turks and their return to Georgia. The issue was discussed during the last meeting of the Turkish and Georgian presidents January 20, 2014.
According to the adopted in the 2011 National Security Concept of Georgia's relations with Azerbaijan are characterized as strategic partnership. In this strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, the Georgian side is seen almost exclusively in the context of energy and communication projects. Also noteworthy is that in the same document named Turkey as a key partner in the region and Georgia regional leader , with whom relations are important for Georgia in terms of socio - economic and political-military relations.
It is possible that Georgia's position on a common format of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey may change somewhat. Obviously, the new Georgian authorities refuse too radical anti-Russian policy , which may also lead to some relaxation of its policy towards Armenia. In a substantial part of the Georgian political elite and the public have concerns asymmetry Azerbaijani-Georgian and Turkish- Georgian relations. There are fears that Azerbaijan and Turkey took inadequately strong positions in domestic and foreign policy , and economic life of Georgia. Growing geopolitical Georgia's dependence on the implementation of Azerbaijani energy and communication projects. Although it was Georgia that would have to get more benefits from its transit position monopolized by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Celebrated and rising Turkish influence in Adjara.
Sentiment indicator within the Georgian elite and the public can serve as anti-Turkish / anti-Muslim statements and declarations that have occurred in Adjara after coming to power, " Georgian Dream ". According to experts, this factor may affect the prospects of the Azerbaijani -Turkish- Georgian relations