Exclusive interview of the director of the Institute prof. Roman Rybarsky Mr. Mariusz Patey (Poland)
1 - How would You describe current Poland-Russia relations?
A few notes:
Russia was always ambivalent partner for Poland. If we focus on last 30 years we see probes from Polish site to implement more closed cooperation with Russia, usually ended by Kremlin’s unfriendly initiatives.
How our relations looks like now?
90% of imported oil camming from Russia
Almost 23% of Russian exported oil goes to Poland.
Russia is number one exporter of oil based products to Poland.
80% of imported to Poland gas came from Gazprom.
Poland also import high volume of coal from Russia.
6% of Polish export goes to Russia.
From other hand Russia doesn’t give any secure and stable environment for Polish investments.. Instead of current crisis made by Crimea annexation and war in Donbass Poland always had problems with Russian assertive economy policy.
Poland notes high deficits in trade with Russia mainly because of their assertive not symmetric responds on rising Polish export and unfriendly political acts .
Russia expects from Poland to accept their revisionist politics in post soviet area.
However, Poland because of its historical experience cannot ignore rights of smaller nations to build their independent states, can not accept questioning existing architecture of safety in our region.
Kremlin initiatives seems that also they do not accept Polish active participation in NATO.
Poland would like to keep going good relations with Russia on win win base.
The problem is, that current Russian government do not see Poland like a partner, but potencjal area of their influence.
NS 1 and 2 shows, that Middle and Eastern Europe is treat by Russia like potencial area of their interests which can be realise above the interests of the countries of the region.
One of principles of Polish foreign policy for Russia is to build effective tools to resistance against Russian revisionism in the region and also decrease level of risks of military conflict in Middle and Eastern Europe.
Decrease deficits in Polish-Russian trade and create possibility for developing competitive energy market in region of Middle and Eastern Europe where of course will be place for Russia as the important player but not monopolist.
2 What can be expected from the oncoming NATO Summit in Brussels?
After wars in Georgia, Crimea annexation, war in Donbass Poland feels real pressure from Russia which reminds case of Anschluss of Austria time.
Poland will try to persuade other NATO members to accept planes of develope defence NATO infrastructure in Poland, Baltic States and Romania.
Polish participation in NATO is not connected in any aggressive planes against any country, but it is treat as a important factor of stability and peace in Europe.
Poland will also lobby for more closed cooperation between Ukraine and NATO and continue sanction policy against Russia until they stop support war in Donbas.
Pro European Ukrainian vector and EU membership expectations are fully supported by Poland.
Ukraine is treated like a potentially important partner for Poland in building infrastructure of the oil and gas transport corridors and creating common and competitive energy market in the region.
NATO warranties are important for safety of those investments.
3 Which position of Poland in the projects of energy transit and security?
Poland will continue develop infrastructure for oil and gas transportation on North South direction together with regional partners.
Competitive, mixed energy market is the one of strategic topics of Polish political policy.